Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Barbara J. Warren v. Robert L. Warren : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsNicolaas de Jonge; Attorney for Defendant-RespondentPaul H.
Proctor; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Warren v. Warren, No. 17514 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2543

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

BARBARA J. WARREN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 17514

ROBERT L. WARREN,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge

Paul H. Proctor
DART & STEGALL
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
Nicolaas de Jonge
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for DefendantRespondent

FILED
JUL 2 8 1981

.....

__.... --------------------------------

Cler..of Supnme
Coart,
Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
Museum and
Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

BARBARA J. WARREN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 17514

ROBERT L. WARREN,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge

Paul H. Proctor
DART & STEGALL
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
Nicolaas de Jonge
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for DefendantRespondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

NATURE OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT

8

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW IN
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
A.
The standard for this court's
review of the-decree of divorce.

8

B. The trial court abused its
discretion by awarding an
unwarranted majority of the
property to Mr. Warren.
• • . • • • • .

9

C. The trial court abused its
discretion by ordering that
Mrs. Warren pay a disproportionate
amount of the marital liabilities.

20

D. The trial court abused its
discretion in awarding an
insufficient amount of alimony
for too limited a period of time.

22

E.
The trial court abused its
discretion in failing to award
to Mrs. Warren any attorney's fees.

27

CONCLUSION • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • •

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

CASES CITED
Pag;

Alldrege v. Alldrege,
119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 (1951) • • • • • • • • 27-26
Allen v. Allen,
601 P.2d 760 (Okla. App. 1979)

• • • • • • •

2:

Christensen v. Christensen,
21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P.2d 511 (1968) . . . . . . , 9, 28
DeRose v. DeRose,
19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967)

.......

Ehninger v. Ehninger,
569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977)

e

•

e

e

•

e

•

e

e

e

0

I

17-18

Englert v. Englert,
576 P.2d 1274 (Utatr 1978)

e

e

•

e

e

e

e

e

e

e

0

I

18

English v. English,
565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977)

.

.

Frank v. Frank,
585 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978)
Gramme v. Gramme,
587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978)

25
25

....

Granziano v. Granziano,
7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931 (1958)

.

23

...... .

Griffiths v. Griffiths,
3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983 (1955) • . • . . . · •

28

Harding v. Harding,
26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971) • . . • . · ·
In re Marriage of Metcalfe,
598 P.2d 1140 (Mont. 1979)

•.••.•. · · · ·

King v. King,
25 Utah 2d 163, 478 P.2d 308 (1971) . . · · · · ·

ii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

Pope v.

Pope,

589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1978)

15

Read v. Read,
594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979)

12-13. 15

Tremayne v. Tremayne,
116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949)

26

Watson v. Watson,
561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977) • . . .

9

Wilson v. Wilson,
5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956)

24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
iii provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

BARBARA J. WARREN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 17514

ROBERT L. WARREN,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

BRI EF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff
wife appeals from the property and debt distribution and
alimony award entered by the trial judge, and from the trial
court's failure to award attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following an extensive pre-trial order and a
two-day trial before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, a divorce
was granted to the plaintiff wife.

The husband was awarded

58 percent of the parties' accumulated property and the
balance was awarded to the wife.

However, of the 42 percent

of the marital estate awarded to the wife, 76 percent
consists of personal property valued in accordance with the
husband's statement.

Of that property awarded to the
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husband, 72 percent consists of stocks valued according to
national stock exchange quotations of the day of the trial
and vested retirement funds.

The husband was given a lien

upon the home for his equity, which lien was to be paid in
any event within six months of the decree of divorce, when
the parties' eldest child graduated from high school.

The

wife was awarded alimony in the sum of $400 per month for a
period of 48 months.

The wife was ordered to assume and pa:

72 percent of the marital obligations.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant Barbara J. Warren respectful!;
requests that this court remand the case for a new tritl

~

respect to the distribution of the property of the parties,
the order for the payment of marital debts and obligations,
for a reconsideration of a reasonable amount of alimony

a~

the time period over which such alimony is to be paid ud t
a consideration of the attorney'.s fees incurred by the
plaintiff-appellant in the trial of this action and upoo
appeal.

Alternatively, plaintiff-appellant respectfully

requests the Court to consider the evidence presented at tbE
trial and contained within the record on appeal and to
fashion its own award.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 21, 1979, plaintiff filed the complaint
for divorce.

Following extensive discovery and numerous

appearances before the court, the action was tried before the
Honorable Peter F. Leary on September 5, 1980, and
September 11, 1980.

By a memorandum decision of November 14,

1980, the plaintiff-appellant,
awarded a decree of divorce.

hereinafte~

"Mrs. Warren", was

In dividing the real and

personal property of the parties, and in ordering the
assumption and payment of marital liabilities, the trial
court adopted without modification the proposed division of
the marital estate and proposed division of the marital
liabilities which had been presented by defendant-respondent,
hereinafter "Mr. Warren".

The trial court awarded additional

personal property to Mr. Warren.

Following a hearing on

December 3, 1980, concerning the clarification of the court's
memorandum decision, the decree of divorce was signed on
December 16, and was entered on December 17, 1980.

Custody

of the one minor child of the parties was awarded to Mrs.
Warren.

During the pendency of this appeal, that child has

graduated from high school and is now of majority.
The parties were married in San Antonio, Texas, on
June 27, 1952.

At the time of the marriage, Mr. Warren had

just completed his sophomore year of college.

While he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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worked part-time for two months out of the year, he was a
full-time student for nine months out of the year, and
Mrs. Warren was the sole support of the family.
(Tr.) at 60-61; Record (R.) at 434-435.)

( Transcri;

Mr. Warren attena,

Rice Institute in Houston, Texas for five years.

Mrs, War:-

paid his expenses for that attendance and in addition
provided support and maintenance as well as luxuries such
three sports cars.

,
1

(Tr. 61; R. 435.)

Following his graduation, Mr. Warren began~~~
for LCB in Dallas, Texas, the company now being known as
E Systems.

Mr. Warren--has worked for this company for 26

years, during which time his income and benefits have
increased dramatically.

In the year before the divorce

trial, 1979, Mr. Warren's gross income was $46,628.
(Tr. 152; R. 520.)

In that same year, Mrs. Warren's gross

income from a legacy was $8,048.09.

(Tr. 206; R. 580.)

Mrs. Warren's independent source of income is a
trust and bank stock acquired from her father prior to
marriage.

The principal of her legacy was, at the

trial, approximately $97,500.

~r

time~

Despite the extreme

differences in their income, Mrs. Warren's legacy was,
many times during the marriage, depleted in order to pay tbe
income tax liabilities of the parties.

4

(Tr. 154; R. 528.)
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In April of 1977, when Barbara's income was $10,200, $4,300
was applied to an Internal Revenue Service bill.
K. 535.)

(Tr. 161;

Mr. Warren, incredibly, testified that of the 1979

$5,200 tax obligation, one-half of the obligation is
attributable to Mrs. Warren's income dividends and interest.
(Tr. 185-186; R.

559-560.)

From the principal of the trust,

$146,599.10 was contributed to the marriage (Tr. 57; R.
431.)
Mrs. Warren testified that the legacy was used for
family expenses because Mr. Warren refused to provide for the
family.

(Tr. 59; R. 433.)

In the years immediately prior to

the divorce, pleas that Mr. Warren contribute to the expenses
of the family produced only feeble responses.

Mr. Warren's

contributions sunk to the paltry sum of $450 during one of
these years.

It fell upon Mrs. Warren to pay the children's

living expenses, dental bills and educational expenses.

71; R.

(Tr.

445.)
The trial court found that Mrs. Warren, who is 49

years of age, is "capable of being employed although she has
never been employed, has no skills and is suffering from
medical problem [sic) relating to her hands."

This

assumption, clearly inconsistent with recognized facts,

5
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resulted in Mrs. Warren being awarded alimony of $400 per
month for a 48-month period.
According to Mr. Warren,

the personal property

either inherited by Mrs. Warren or awarded to her by the
decree of divorce is worth $161,000.

(Tr. 180; R. 554.)

This value, which was accepted by the court in its decree::
divorce,

is without foundation.

Even the appraiser of llie

property, Thomas A. Olsen, a witness for the defendant,
stated that be bad spent little better than an hour in hls
appraisal of the personal property in the home and that thi'
was insufficient time to perform a valid or satisfactory
appraisal.

(Tr. 15; R. 389.)

Values of specific items of

property declared by Mr. Warren are on their face
speculative.

For example, in defendant's Exhibit 21-D,

Mr. Warren values china and art objects at $17,000 and a
large oil painting at $2,500.

Yet Mr. Warren had no

recollection of the name of the painter, did not itemize th<
art objects and offered no foundation for this value other
than his estimate of the replacement value of the property.
The value of the personal property ultimately
awarded to Mrs. Warren was in fact an estimate of replaceme:
value, without any rel a ti on to the actual market value of
property.

t:

(See testimony of Thomas A. Olsen, Tr. 22; R. 39i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
6
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Testimony of William C. McConabay, Tr. 30; R.

404; Testimony

of Carl G. Walberg, Tr. 38; R. 412.)
In addition to bis substantial income, Mr. Warren
acquired a substantial interest in stock.

Valued according

to the figures quoted by tbe Wall Street Journal on tbe day
before tbe trial, Mr. Warren owned $73,840.50 of currently
traded marketable stock.

Furthermore, be bad a pension plan

with a present value of $20,247 and a future value estimated
by Mr. Warren at $51,000.

(Tr. 193; R. 567.)

During the

marriage, Mr. Warren developed a capability to earn a
substantial income (he ·estimated that he had made
approximately $500,000 in his lifetime), a capability which
remained with him at the time of the decree of divorce.
On the other hand, Mrs. Warren, who contributed to
the marriage approximately $300,000 from the principal and
interest of her legacy, was at the time of the decree of
divorce and according to the judge's findings, not employed,
without skills, and suffering from a medical problem related
to her hands.

She is left with a depleted inheritance with

a greatly reduced value for generation of future income.

The

decrease in the value of the trust was directly related to
her support of the marriage.

It was for the purchase of the

second marital home that money was withdrawn from the
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principal of her inheritance.

(Tr • 58 ,· R • 432 · )

Money wa,

also withdrawn to pay for the day-to-day living expenses ~
the family and to provide family necessities such as mect·lea.
care (Tr. 71; R. 445).

This same legacy conveniently

provided Mr. Warren with an educ a ti on which permitted him!.
substantially increase his own earning capacity and provide:
him with luxuries in life.

(Tr. 60; R.

434.)

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND WAS

MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLI-CABLE LAW IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
A.

The standard for this court's review of

the decree of divorce.
This court has on innumerable occasions held that
divorce action is equitable in nature and that the ruling o'
a trial judge is favored with a presumption of propriety anc
accuracy.

This court has also held that it can review

questions of both law and fact.

King v. King, 25 Utah~

163, 478 P. 2d 492 ( 1970); appeal after remand 27 Utah 2d 30o
495 P.2d 823.

Though they are favored,

findings, judgments

and decrees of the trial court are still subject to review
for the trial court's discretion is not without limitation.
DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967).

8
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Shoui:

the trial court fail to correctly apply principles of law or
equity, or should evidence clearly preponderate against a
finding, or should a judgment or decree so fail to do equity
that a clear abuse of discretion is manifested, then this
Court will take the appropriate corrective action necessary.
Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977).

When such error

has occurred, the Supreme Court may review the evidence and
make its own findings and may substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court when the ends of justice so require.
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971).
On appeal, thts court may review a case, weigh
evidence and may substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.
931 (1958).

Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 F.2d
If after such a review it is found that the

decree works an injustice contrary to equity and conscience,
this court may revise the decree.

Christensen v.

Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P.2d 511 (1968).
B.

The trial court abused its discretion by

awarding an unwarranted majority of the property to
Mr. Warren.
The trial court adopted, without modification, the
proposed distribution of the marital property submitted on
behalf of the defendant.

Defendant's Exhibit 31-D.

9

In so
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doing,

the court adopted the property or asset values whl:

had been stipulated to by the parties or which were
Mr. Warren's estimate.

Mr. Warren's stated values grossly

exaggerate the actual value of the property awarded to
Mrs. Warren, particularly when compared to the actual value
of the property awarded to Mr. Warren.
Within the pre-trial order, Mr. Warren

agre~ ~~

the legacy left to Mrs. Warren, which she had acquired

~K

to the marriage, was to remain the personal property of
Mrs. Warren.

This legacy had a value of approximately

$97, 500 and had in prir:reipal been reduced during the marria;.

by approximately $146, 500.

The reduction of the principal

had been utilized for the benefit of the marriage and in
support of the family.

(Tr. 57; R. 431; Tr. 59; R. 433.)

From the marital estate, Mrs. Warren was awarded
the agreed upon equity in the home or $23, 500.

one-half~

The balance

of the marital estate awarded to Mrs. Warren was comprised o:
personal property valued on a replacement basis by the
defendant or by experts chosen by the defendant.

In

particular, the one appraiser who testified, Thomas Olsen,
stated that he had insufficient time in which to perform a
valid or satisfactory appraisal.

(Tr. 15; R. 389.)

10
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On the otherhand, the portion of the marital estate
awarded to Mr. Warren was substantially liquid and growth
oriented or income producing.

Mr. Warren was awarded stocks

traded on the major exchanges and valued at the time of the
divorce action at $45.75 per share; he was also awarded a
retirement fund with a present value of over $20,000 and a
future value of $51,000.

In addition, Mr. Warren was

permitted to retain a substantial amount of his current
income having been ordered to pay only $400 per month for a
period of 48 months as alimony.
The trial court's misunderstanding of the value of
the property may be found in the internal inconsistencies in
the defendant's own testimony and that of his experts with
respect to the value.

The defendant offered replacement

value estimates or estimates of value without any reasonable
foundation, for example his estimate of the value of a
painting.

(Tr. 246; R. 620.)

In the pre-trial order,

Mrs. Warren was ordered to provide supporting documentation
reflecting purchase dates, costs, and present value of those
items of personal property located within the home.

Later,

at trial, the court expressed its intention to have the
property of the parties appraised.

(Tr. 249; R. 623.)

However, this appraisal was apparently never performed, and
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the document presented by Mrs. Warren pursuant to the
pre-trial order, Exhibit 5-P, was ignored by the court. ~
values accepted by the trial court were contrary to
statements made by Mrs. Warren that the appraisals submitte:
by Mr. Warren were grossly exaggerated.
146; R. 520.)

(Tr. 73; R. 447; !:

Mrs. Warren's former counsel never elicited

from her a valuation of the property.
In Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979), the
court recognized that the discretion afforded the trial

~~

in allocating property and financial resources is not witho.
limit.

In that case, a-pproxima tely 90 percent of the assets

accumulated by the parties during a 25-year marriage were
awarded to the plaintiff wife.

This court stated the purpoi''

of a property settlement should not be to impose
upon either party.

Rather,

i

punish~M

the court is to consider many

factors in making a property settlement in a divorce
proceeding bearing in mind the ultimate goal of

arrangiq~

best possible allocation of the property and the economk
resources of the parties so that the parties can pursue t~t
lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible.
If it appears that the decree is so
discordant with an equitable
allocation that it will more likely
lead to further difficulties and
distress than to serve the desired

12
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objective, then a reappraisal of the
decree must be undertaken.
594 P.2d at 872.

In Read v. Read, the court recognized the

inconsistencies and unresolved questions in the trial record
regarding the values of property and as a consequence
remanded the case to the trial court for a further hearing
concerning the nature and extent of the parties assets and
liabilities.

In particular, the court questioned the value

of an unimproved parcel of real property at $60,000 when the
only credible evidence concerning its value indicated it to
be worth $30,000 and $35,000.
Similar inconsistencies and unresolved questions
may be found in the trial of the action now before the court.
Even the trial court questioned the accuracy of the estimates
of the value of personal property and indicated the need for
an objective appraisal of the property.

Such questions of

the accuracy of the value of the property arises naturally
when one sees estimates of $17,000 for art objects that are
not enumerated, or values of paintings without any reference
to the artist.

Questions also arise concerning the valuation

of jewelry at $19,886 without any evidence whatsoever of the
present market or actual value of such jewelry.
In Exhibit 16-D received from the defendant, a
statement is made by an appraiser that the personal contents
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of the home were worth a minimum of $50, 000 on an immectiai.
sale basis and had a retail replacement value of near
$100,000.

This appraisal was based upon a walk-through

01

the home, which the appraiser himself testified was
insufficient as the foundation for an accurate appraisal.
The defendant then valued this property at $161,000, lliis
final value being the one accepted by the court.

The

defendant agreed that Mrs. Warren be awarded $71,732 in
inherited personal property and $44,240 in personal
acquired during the marriage.

pro~~

Mr. Warren also claimed

(Exhibit 31-D) that his-valuation of the property awarded t:
Mrs. Warren compared favorably with the property he desim
to be awarded.

This comparison is inaccurate in light of

t:

very different types of property; his is income-producing a1
hers of little value to her support.
When viewed without the taint of over-valued
personal property, and considering only that portion cl t~
marital estate (exclusive of Mrs. Warren's legacy) comprisec
of stocks, retirement plans and real property, Mr. Warrn~
awarded 84 percent of such property.

It is this type of

property distribution which has been found to be excessin
and inequitable and one which results in the imposition of'

14
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.

penalty upon a party,

in this case Mrs. Warren.

(See, Read

v. Read, supra.)
An indication of the misunderstanding of
Mrs. Warren's needs may be found in the court's statement
with reference to Mrs. Warren that this was a case of "what I
have is mine and what was acquired through the endeavors of
my husband is ours."

(Tr. 263; R. 637.)

In Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978), the
court approved a distribution of the net value of property
which gave 65 percent to the plaintiff wife and 35 percent to
the defendant husband. -In response to the husband's claim
that such a division was inequitable, the court pointed out
that the defendant husband was awarded income-producing
assets of the family.

It was also noted that the defendant

husband had two college degrees and several years experience
in operating his businesses and thus was reasonably assured
of future earnings and profits from his business activities.
On the other hand, the plaintiff wife had no college
education and was unemployed at the time of trial.

The court

had awarded her no alimony.
The trial court's decree of divorce in this case is
contrary to the equitable principle of Pope v. Pope, for it
awards a substantial majority of the total property, almost

15
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all of the income-producing property and that which assure:
future earnings, to the educated, experienced and employab:
husband.

The decree leaves little but grossly over-val~

personal property to the unemployable, uneducated wife mother of 29 years.
It may be that the trial court misunderstood the
nature of Mr. Warren's future income.

The accepted propen

distribution as submitted by the defendant, Exhibit 31-0,
reflects a value of a retirement fund of $20,247 and of a
stock option plan of $19,388, conditioned by defendant's
statement that these were "assets realizable only upon
retirement--not liquid."

This was clearly a question in

th:

court's mind as the court requested a detailed explanation
the pension plan.

(Tr. 266; R. 640.)

There is no evidence:

in the record that this information was ever provided.
Mr. Warren's own testimony suggests that Exhibit 31-D is no'.
an accurate statement of the value of the pension plan

a~

stock option plan either in the future or at the present.
The following exchange occurred between the court and
Mr. Warren (Tr. 253; R. 627):
THE COURT:
Mr. Warren, I have a couple
of questions.
In connection with
your pension, if you were to die
tomorrow, what would happen with
your pension?

16
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MR. WARREN:
It would revert to my heirs
on an annuity basis, I think.
THE COURT:
it?

Well, would it or wouldn't

ANSWER:
I'm not really sure.
I've got
somewhere the information on it.
THE COURT:

Well--.

ANSWER:
And
believe
$50,000
present

it would revert to them I
at that lump sum value of
rather than the discounted
value of $20,000.

Contrary to his statement on Exhibit 31-D that the
assets were realizable only upon retirement, Mr. Warren
testified that the stocK option plan was available to him one
year after separation from the company (Tr. 194; R. 568) and
that he was 80 percent vested in the company-funded pension
plan.
What Mr. Warren was concerned about was the
inclusion of his retirement fund at an accurate value into
the marital estate.

The propriety of the consideration of

such a retirement fund as part of the assets available for
distribution was upheld by this court in Ehninger v.
Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977).

In that case, the

dissatisfied husband contended that "the trial court erred in
placing a value upon and making a division of • · • the
defendant's profit sharing plan, the purpose of which [was]

17
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r
I

for his retirement" and the benefit of which would be
available to him only upon retirement.

569 P.2d at

11~.

This court held that the inclusion of the husband's vested
but not immediately available, interest in his retirement
fund was appropriate.

569 P.2d at 1106.

Moreover,

th~

court recently upheld a property distribution which
considered as a family asset the bus-band's accrued interes·
in a retirement fund.

In Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 12;;

(Utah 1978), the husband contended that:
His retirment fund is not "property"
within the meaning of our statute and
should not be-so considered in
determining the rights of the parties
under the divorce decree.
He reasons
that because that fund was accumulated as
a result of his service and tenure, it is
inequitable to permit [his wife) to
participate therein.
576 P.2d at 1275.
This contention was rejected and this court
approved the inclusion of the fund at its accrued value at
the time of trial.

The future value as testified to

~

Mr. Warren of $51, 000 was based upon a perhaps unrealistic
8 percent interest rate.

Such a low interest rate no d~M

greatly undervalues the retirement fund.
Throughout the trial, Mr. Warren made gratuitous
statements in an attempt to convince the court of his
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impoverished condition and the wealth of his wife.

In

discussing his purchase of stock commencing in 1976, he
stated "I had no estate whatever, because we had spent all of
my income for all the years up until then, and I was planning
for my retirement".

(Tr. 190; R. 564.)

In the same exchange

with his counsel he admits that the company maintained a
stock option retirement program and a company funded pension
plan.

Mr. Warren knew that Mrs. Warren had contributed

heavily to the welfare and benefit of the household, had put
him through school and that together they had amassed a
significant estate, by liis figures worth over $150,000 in
personal property alone.

(Tr. 155; R. 529; Tr. 168; R. 542.)

Mr. Warren also does not disclose that the stock valued at
$45.75 on the day before the trial was purchased at less than
one half of that value.

(See, Defendant's Second Amended

Answers to Interrogatories, R. 87.)
Mr. Warren also inaccurately. states that his wife
did not need alimony because she had a separate estate of
almost $200,000.

(Tr. 233; R. 607.)

Mr. Warren must have

known that this was an overvaluation of her estate as he
admitted that he had prepared the taxe returns throughout the
marriage and as a consequence would have to have known what
her estate was and that he was aware of bank documents which
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stated the value of the estate at $87,942.

(Tr. 244; R,

618.)

c.

The trial court abused its discretion o;

ordering that Mrs. Warren pay a disproportionate amount

-

-

-

~

the marital liabilities.
The court adopted without modification the
defendant's proposed division of marital liabilities set
forth in defendant's Exhibit 33-D.

Of the $16,238 in totai

marital debts and obligations, Mrs. Warren was ordered
$11,634 or 72 percent.

to~'

The testimony of both parties wut

the effect that the majOri ty of the debts listed on Exhibit
33-D were incurred prior to the separation of the partiu
which occurred in August of 1979.

(Tr. 89; R. 463; Tr. 23U

R. 612.)

In distributing the debts, the court apparentU
failed to consider that Mrs. Warren's income was a fixed
income from the principal of the trust and from alimony ana
that reductions in principal of the tTust utilized to pay t!
debts would reduce the amount of her monthly income.

~~I

other hand, Mr. Warren had a significant monthly income d~
had grown consistently in the 26 years he had been with his
employer and would in all likelihood continue to grow.
(Tr. 238; R. 612.)

The mistake made by the trial court in
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its division of marital liabilities is most clearly pointed
out by the ordering of Mrs. Warren to pay one-half of an
income tax bill which totalled $5,207 when her income for the
year of the tax liability, 1979, was approximately 1/6 of
Mr. Warren's income.
It has been found inequitable to award a party an
interest in property but at the same time absolve them of any
obligation to clear those debts which were created in the
acquisition of the property.

See, Allen v. Allen, 601 P.2d

760 (Okla.App. 1979).
It has been he-ld an abuse of discretion for the
court to fail to consider the liabilities of the party and
the burden that these liabilities have on each party.
Certainly they must be considered in arriving at the net
award to each party.
1140 (Mont. 1979).

In re Marriage of Metcalfe, 598 P.2d
In Metcalfe, the court realized that the

assumption of a debt would effectively reduce the marital
estate awarded to one party.

The court also recognized that

the distribution of debt would make it difficult for one
party to meet the obligations she had assumed.

Certainly in

the case before this court, a significant amount of the debt
was ordered paid by that person with a fixed non-growth
oriented income.

The inequity of the debt distribution is
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also made obvious by Mr. Warren's admissions of having
credit cards for his benefit or for the children.

UH:

(Tr.

183-186; R. 557-560.)
D.

The trial court abused its discretion

i:

awarding an insufficient amount of alimony for too limited.

--.:.

period of time.
From Mr. Warren's demonstrated ability to acquir;
significant monthly income, Mrs. Warren was awarded $400r
month alimony for a 48 month period.

The court specificaL

found that Mr. Warren's net monthly take-home income was

$1, 887.

The court found that Mrs. Warren had an independen:

source of income of an unspecified amount.

Throughout tbe

course of this litigation, Mr. Warren has taken the posttk
that Mrs. Warren had a gross income from her trust of $800
per month.

(See, Defendant-respondant' s Motion for Summan

Disposition; Tr. 205; R. 579.)

With the $400 monthly

alimony, Mr. Warren maintains that Mrs. Warren has a grou
income of $1,200 per month.
However, Mr. Warren fails to take into accou~ ~
Mrs. Warren's gross income is subject to taxes and that be
will be receiving a substantial tax benefit from the
deduction of the alimony payments.

Consequently, the

disparity of the monthly incomes is much more severe than
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Mr. Warren will admit.

Additionally, as Mrs. Warren must

withdraw principal from her trust in order to pay obligations
and in order to maintain the standard of living to which she
has become accustomed, the amount of her gross monthly income
will significantly decrease.
This court has recently recognized those factors to
be considered by an award of alimony.
587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978).

Gramme v. Gramme,

This court stated:

The purpose of alimony is to provide
post-marital support; it is intended
neither as a penalty imposed on the
husband nor as a reward granted to the
wife.
Its function is to provide support
for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage and to prevent her from becoming
a public charge.
Important criteria in
determining a reasonable award for
support and maintenance are the financial
conditions and needs of the wife,
considering her station in life; her
ability to produce sufficient income for
herself; and the ability of the husband
to provide support.
In the present case, and throughout the 29-year marriage,
Mrs. Warren raised the parties' family and maintained the
household, and as found by the court was never employed, has
no skills and suffers a medical disability of her hands.
During the marriage, Mr. Warren prospered in his career and
developed a significant income which continued to grow after
the dissolution of the marriage.
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from the marriage all marketable or liquid assets and

P~

such a minimal amount of alimony can only be characterizec
an enormous windfall to Mr. Warren.
In light of the long duration of the marriage,

i·

Warren's demonstrated substantial income and continued iK
potential, and the standard of living to which Mrs. hrm
has grown accustomed during the marriage, the trial court':
award of alimony in the amount of $400 per month for a
limited four-year period must be said to be an abuse of
discretion.

These very factors have long been held

~ ~

court to be of signific&nce in determining the wife's
entitlement to alimony.
296 P.2d 977 (1956),

In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79

the marriage had lasted 15 years and:

principal issue on appeal was the appropriate amount
alimony to be awarded.

~

This court held that in determinini

alimony,
[T]he court's responsibility is to
endeavor to provide a just and equitable
adjustment of [the parties'] economic
resources so that the parties can
reconstruct their lives on a happy and
useful basis.
In doing so it is
necessary for the court to consider . ·
an appraisal of all of the attendant
facts and circumstances:
the duration of
the marriage; the ages of the parties;
their social positions and standards of
living; their health; considerations
relative to children; the money and
property they possess and how it was
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....

acquired; and their capabilities and
training and their present and potential
incomes.
296 P.2d at 979-80.

Application of these factors in the

present case renders inescapable the conclusion that the
trial court abused its discretion in the alimony award.
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), it
was held in connection with a 20-year marriage that:
[T)he most important function of alimony
is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage,
and to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge.
565 P.2d at 411.
In Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978), in
response to questions over an alimony award, the court
observed:
How the defenant, or anyone on his
behalf, could even suggest that a wife
who had devoted 21 years to her marriage
and reared a family should be turned out
to subsist on her own is as discordant to
our sense of justice as it was to the
trial judge.
585 P.2d at 455.
During this marriage, Mr. Warren's salary has
significantly increased.

Utilizing both that income and

depleting Mrs. Warren's legacy, the parties have acquired a
significant marital estate.

Mr. Warren has received a great
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amount of benefit by the use of Mrs. Warren's legacy
receiving luxuries in life such as three sports cars.

~

would now ask the court to force Mrs. Warren to live off
severely depleted legacy and on an insufficient amount oi
alimony while he takes from the marriage any property tha•
will provide an income in the future.
In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d.
(1949), the court addressed the matter of the distributioc
property as follows:
Through schooling, appellant's earning
capacity has been substantially increased
during the ma-rriage.
And respondent's
earning capacity has not been
proportionally increased during that
time.
To make this schooling and their
savings possible, she worked practically
throughout their married life.
Without
her working the bulk of the property
which they have, would not have been
accumulated, and he probably could not
have accumulated it had he been single
and had he followed the same course which
he did.
How far either one would have
gone without the other is largely a
matter of conjecture.
211 P.2d at 454 (numerous citations omitted).

This languai•

is directly applicable to the circumstances of this case fc:
Mr. Warren's schooling was provided by Mrs. Warren's legac:
and the marriage was supported by that legacy in its early
years.

Substantial portions of her income were paid to

support the marriage on a day-to-day basis as well as W
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provide it with the luxuries of life, freeing Mr. Warren's
income and permitting the acquisition of large amounts of
stock.

(Tr. 153; R. 527.)

Under these circumstances, the

alimony award is inadequate and inequitable.
E.

The trial court abused its discretion in

failing to award to Mrs. Warren any attorney's fees.
Mrs. Warren testified that she desired the court
award her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection
(Tr. 94; R. 468).

with this action.

However, the court in

its memorandum decision stated "no evidence having been
presented as to attornef's fees, none are awarded."
Mrs. Warren was ordered to pay a substantial
manjority of the debts of the parties and was left with a
decreasing income.

Mr. Warren's income at the time of the

decree of divorce was approximately six times as great as
Mrs. Warren's.

In such circumstances, this court has

repeatedly held that an award of attorney's fees to the wife
is appropriate.

For example, in Alldredge v. Alldredge,

119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 (1951), it was pointed out that
this Court had traditionally adhered to the policy that:
The awarding of counsel fees as well
as alimony was in the discretion of
the trial court, and that a finding of
the trial court would not be set aside
in the absence of an abuse of such
discretion • • . .
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It was error for the court to deny the
[wife] counsel fees which are a part of
her costs pendente lite and which could
have ben required before the suit was
concluded.
229 P.2d at 686-87.
The trial court's failure to award attorney's fe,
to the wife was, likewise, reversed in Christensen v.
Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967); and
Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983 (1955),
The trial court's failure to award

attorney's~

can only be justified by the misapprehension that the
property settlement favors Mrs. Warren.

Once this

misapprehension is dispelled, Mr. Warren's argument

must

evaporate along with it.
Mrs. Warren's trial counsel withdrew following to'
entry of the decree of divorce and in early January 1980
filed a civil action against her to recover those attorney';
fees which she had incurred in the approximate sum of $7,00i
Robinson and Wells, P. C. v. Barbara J. Warren, Third Judici 0
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil~.
C-81-14.

The trial court's failure to award the attorney's

fees was but an additional burden upon Mrs. Warren which,
like the other debts she was ordered to pay, will
substantially reduce her monthly income.
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CONCLUSION
Whether reviewed in part or in total, the decree of
divorce fashioned by the trial court deprives Mrs. Warren of
any meaningful benefit of the estate acquired by these
parties during their 29-year marriage.

Mrs. Warren takes

from the marriage, only that which she brought to it.
Mr. Warren does not dispute that Mrs. Warren's substantial
legacy was utilized to a great extent to support the marriage
and it is undisputed that the legacy returned to her by the
decree of divorce is in no way capable of producing the
income necessary to maintain the standard of living to which
Mrs. Warren had grown accustomed.

At the same time, when one

considers the property awarded to the husband, it becomes
clear that he leaves the marriage with a windfall with a
substantial income and substantial income-producing stock.
It must be kept in mind that Mrs. Warren's legacy supported
the marriage, making possible the investments which
Mr. Warren now takes from the marriage.
The decree of divorce fashioned by the trial court
does abuse that court's discretion in the area of marital
liabilities, for that party least able to pay was ordered to
assume 72 percent of the marital obligations.

The only

reasonable source to satisfy these obligations, Mrs. Warren's
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legacy, will be reduced and in turn so will Mrs. Warren's
monthly income.

This same argument is true with respect t

the f ai 1 ure of the trial court to award any attorney's fee;
Mr. Warren's substantial income and substantial assets re[i.
untouched, while Mrs. Warren must further deplete that leg•
which is to provide her with support for the rest of her
life.
The alimony awarded to Mrs. Warren, $400 per mont:
for a 48-mon th period, is a clear abuse of the trial court'·
discretion when viewed in light of the nature of the proper
awarded to Mr. Warren as well as his present income.

T~

trial court clearly misunderstood the evidence of
Mrs. Warren's ability to support herself and that of
Mr. Warren to provide for her.

The decree of divorce U

based upon a comparison of Mr. Warren's net income without
consideration of the tax benefit from the payment of tl~~
to Mrs. Warren's gross income prior to the satisfaction of
tax liabilities.

Also, the court failed to take into~~

the decrease in the monthly income from Mrs. Warren's lega1
due to the burdening of her by the marital obligations aod
her own attorney's fees.
Plaintiff-appellant requests this court reverse::
decree of divorce entered by the trial court and either
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remand this action for a new trial or fashion an equitable
and just decree.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27 day of July, 1981.

Paul H. Proctor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this~ day of July, 1981, I
placed with "The Runner--Service" two copies of the foregoing
Appellant's brief to be delivered to Nicolaas de Jonge,
attorney for defendant-respondent, Suite 14, Intrade
Building, 1399 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
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